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Abstract: We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the 
foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment-reducing modifications on only about 3 
percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization: 
Servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are 
robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by 
securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency. Our results are strongest in subsamples in 
which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small and in 
subprime loans. We use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk, the possibility that a borrower will 
still default despite costly renegotiation, and self-cure risk, the possibility that a seriously delinquent 
borrower will become current without renegotiation, make renegotiation unattractive to investors. 
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Many commentators have attributed the severity of the foreclosure crisis in the United States
in the 2007–2009 period to the unwillingness of lenders to renegotiate mortgages, and, as
a consequence, have placed renegotiation at the heart of the policy debate. Every major
policy action to date has involved encouraging lenders, in one way or another, to renegotiate
loan terms in order to reduce borrower debt loads. According to the Treasury-sponsored
HopeNow initiative, in December of 2007 lenders were expected to prevent adjustable-rate
mortgages from increasing to higher rates at the ﬁrst reset of the mortgage.1 “Hope For
Homeowners,” enacted by Congress in July of 2008, envisioned that lenders would write
oﬀ a substantial portion of the principal balance of mortgages for ﬁnancially distressed
households.2 The Obama Adminstration’s Making Home Aﬀordable Plan, announced in
February of 2009, provided ﬁnancial incentives to servicers to renegotiate loans on the
condition that the lenders reduce the interest rate for a signiﬁcant period of time.3
The appeal of renegotiation to policy makers is simple to understand. If a lender makes
a concession to a borrower by, for example, reducing the principal balance on the loan, it
can prevent a foreclosure. This is clearly a good outcome for the borrower, and possibly
good for society as well. But the key to the appeal of renegotiation is the belief that it
can also beneﬁt the lender, as the lender loses money only if the reduction in the value of
the loan exceeds the loss the lender would sustain in a foreclosure. In short, according to
proponents, renegotiation of home mortgages is a type of public policy holy grail, in that it
helps both borrowers and lenders at little or no cost to the government.4
In this paper, we explore the renegotiation of home mortgages using a dataset from
Lender Processing Services (LPS), a large, detailed sample of residential mortgages. Our
primary empirical analysis involves following borrowers over the year subsequent to their ﬁrst
serious delinquency and counting the frequency of renegotiation.5 Measuring renegotiation
in the LPS data is a challenge because there is no ﬁeld in the data that identiﬁes whether or
not a servicer has changed the terms of, or “modiﬁed,” the loan. We overcome this diﬃculty
by developing an algorithm to identify modiﬁcations that we validate on an unrelated dataset
that includes a modiﬁcation ﬂag.
We explore several diﬀerent deﬁnitions of renegotiation in the data. Our ﬁrst deﬁnition
of “renegotiation” is concessionary modiﬁcations that serve to reduce a borrower’s monthly
1Edmund L. Andrews, In Mortgage Plan, Lenders Set Terms, New York Times, Dec. 7, 2007.
2“Bush Signs Wide-Ranging Housing Bill Into Law,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2008.
3See “$275 Billion Plan Seeks To Address Crisis In Housing,” New York Times, Feb. 18, 2009.
4See this discussion in Congressional Oversight Panel (2009), Zingales (2008), and Geanakoplos and
Koniak (2008), as examples.
5Until 2008, the dataset was known as McDash.
2payment. These may be reductions in the principal balance or interest rate, extensions of
the term, or combinations of all three. This deﬁnition of renegotiation is a key focus of our
analysis because there is a consensus among many market observers that concessionary mod-
iﬁcations are the most, or possibly the only, eﬀective way of preventing foreclosures. As the
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) for the Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP)
has written, “Any foreclosure mitigation plan must be based on a method of modifying
or reﬁnancing distressed mortgages into aﬀordable ones. Clear and sustainable aﬀordabil-
ity targets achieved through interest rate reductions, principal write-downs, and/or term
extensions should be a central component of foreclosure mitigation.”6
Because the pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs), which govern the conduct of ser-
vicers when loans are securitized, often place limits on the number of modiﬁcations a servicer
can perform, we broaden our deﬁnition of renegotiation to include any modiﬁcation, regard-
less of whether it lowers the borrower’s payment. Modiﬁcations are often thought to always
involve concessions to the borrower, but many, and in some subsets most, modiﬁcations
involve the capitalization of arrears into the balance of the loan, and thus lead to increased
payments.
Finally, we attempt to include in our deﬁnition of renegotiation the transactions whereby
lenders allow borrowers to extinguish their liabilities by repaying less than the outstanding
balance of the loan. These transactions are known as short payoﬀs, short sales, or deeds-in-
lieu of foreclosure, depending on the structure. We measure this component of renegotiation
by counting the number of seriously delinquent loans that the servicer reports as “paid oﬀ.”
No matter which deﬁnition of renegotiation we use, one message is quite clear: lenders
rarely renegotiate. Fewer than 3 percent of the seriously delinquent borrowers in our sam-
ple received a concessionary modiﬁcation in the year following the ﬁrst serious delinquency.
More borrowers received modiﬁcations under our broader deﬁnition, but the total still ac-
counted for fewer than 8 percent of the seriously delinquent borrowers. And ﬁnally, fewer
than 5 percent of all of our troubled borrowers repaid their mortgages, putting an upper
bound on the number who could have repaid less than the principal balance of the loan.
These numbers are small both in absolute terms, and relative to the approximately half of
the sample for whom foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and the nearly 30 percent for
whom they were also completed.
We next turn to the question of why renegotiation is so rare. If the logic described in
the second paragraph is correct, lenders should ﬁnd renegotiation attractive, even in the
6See the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009). This view is widely held and is the main focus of the
Administration’s Making Home Aﬀordable foreclosure prevention plan was to encourage servicers to modify
loans to reduce monthly payments to 31 percent of income.
3absence of government prodding. Yet, we observe very little renegotiation in the data. We
address this apparent paradox.
The leading explanation attributes the reluctance of lenders to renegotiate to the process
of securitization.
The complex webs that securitization weaves can be a trap and leave no one,
not even those who own the loans, able eﬀectively to save borrowers from fore-
closure. With the loan sliced and tranched into so many separate interests, the
diﬀerent claimants with their antagonistic rights may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to provide
borrowers with the necessary loan modiﬁcations, whether they want to or not. In
the tranche warfare of securitization, unnecessary foreclosures are the collateral
damage. (Eggert 2007)
More precise institutional evidence appears to conﬁrm the role of securitization in impeding
renegotiation. As mentioned in more detail below, PSAs do sometimes place global limits
on the number of modiﬁcations a servicer can perform for a particular pool of mortgages.
In addition, the rules by which servicers are reimbursed for expenses may provide a perverse
incentive to foreclose rather than modify. Furthermore, because servicers do not internalize
the losses on a securitized loan, they may not behave optimally. Another issue is the
possibility that those investors whose claims are adversely aﬀected by modiﬁcation will take
legal action. Finally, historically, SEC rules have stated that contacting a borrower who is
fewer than 60-days delinquent constitutes an ongoing relationship with the borrower and
jeopardizes the oﬀ-balance sheet status of the loan.
But some market observers express doubts about the renegotiation-limiting role of secu-
ritization. Hunt (2009) conducted an exhaustive review of a sample of PSAs and concluded,
“it appears that large-scale modiﬁcation programs may be undertaken without violating
the plain terms of PSAs in most cases.” Although some servicers have expressed concern
about lawsuits, of the more than 800 lawsuits ﬁled by investors in subprime mortgages
through the end of 2008, not one involved the right of a servicer to modify a loan.7 Even
the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009), which did view securitization as a problem in
general, conceded, “The speciﬁc dynamics of servicer incentives are not well understood.”
Finally, the SEC ruled in 2008 that if default was “reasonably forseeable,” then contact with
a borrower prior to 60-day delinquency would not aﬀect the accounting status of the loan.
Our empirical analysis provides strong evidence against the role of securitization in
preventing renegotiation. The LPS dataset includes loans that are serviced for private se-
curitization trusts that are not sponsored by any of the government sponsored enterprises
7Navigant report, Congressional Oversight Panel (2009).
4(GSEs), so-called “private-label” loans, which are subject to all of the contract frictions de-
scribed above. It also includes loans owned by servicers, so-called “portfolio” loans, which
are immune to such problems. We compare renegotiation rates, controlling for observable
characteristics of the loans. For our narrowest deﬁnition of renegotiation, payment-reducing
modiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in the likelihood of renegotiation in the 12 months
subsequent to the ﬁrst 60-day delinquency between the two types of loans is neither econom-
ically nor statistically signiﬁcant. When we consider the broader deﬁnition that includes
any modiﬁcation at all, which, as we mentioned above, we would expect to be most aﬀected
by securitization, the data even more strongly reject the role of securitization in preventing
renegotiation. We also ﬁnd that servicers are more likely to peform modiﬁcations, broadly
deﬁned, and to allow the borrower to prepay on a private-label loan than on a portfolio
loan.
Our results are highly robust. One potential problem with the data is that there is
unobserved heterogeneity in the characteristics of portfolio and private-label loans. To
address this, we exploit subsets of the LPS data, in which servicers provide an exceptional
amount of information about borrowers. When we exclude observations where the servicer
failed to report whether the borrower fully documented income at origination, or what the
debt-to-income ratio was at origination, our results become even stronger. When we focus
only on loans for which the borrower fully documented income, we obtain results that are
broadly consistent or, in some cases, stronger than the results for the full sample. Finally,
we limit our sample to only subprime loans (as deﬁned in LPS). These loans comprise
only 7 percent of the LPS data, but they account for more than 40 percent of all serious
delinquencies and almost 50 percent of the modiﬁcations that we identify in the data. The
results that we obtain for the subprime sample are also consistent with our results for the
full sample.
Another potential issue with our focus on 60-day delinquent loans is that portfolio lenders
can contact borrowers at any time, whereas some securitization agreements forbid lenders
from contacting borrowers until they are at least 60 days delinquent (two missed payments).
When we shift our focus to 30-day delinquent borrowers (one missed payment), our results
continue to show no meaningful diﬀerence between renegotiation of private-label and port-
folio loans.
One other possibility is that our algorithm for identifying modiﬁcations is somehow
missing a class of loss-mitigation actions taken by servicers. Forbearance agreements and
repayment plans, for example, would not necessarily show up in our data. However, neither
of these actions constitutes renegotiation in any classic sense, because the lender still expects
the borrower to repay in full, including interest on any delayed payment. In addition, unlike
5modiﬁcations, PSAs never place any limits on the use of forbearance agreements or repay-
ment plans, so, a priori, we would have less reason to expect a diﬀerence in their use across
private-label and portfolio loans. Finally, most successful forbearance agreements conclude
with a modiﬁcation to allow the borrower to repay the arrears incurred in forbearance. With
all of that said, we test the proposition that servicers engage in other loss mitigation actions
by looking at the “cure rate.” This is the percentage of loans that transition to current
status after becoming 60-days delinquent. We ﬁnd that in the full sample, private-label
loans are less likely to cure, but that the gap, although statistically signiﬁcant, is small —
correcting for observable characteristics, we estimate a cure rate of around 30 percent for
the typical portfolio loan and a cure rate of about 2 percentage points less for an otherwise
equivalent private-label loan. However, for the subprime subsample, the subsample with
information about documentation and debt-to-income (DTI) status, and the sample of fully
documented loans, we ﬁnd that private-label loans are signiﬁcantly more likely to cure.
The policy debate has focused exclusively on the ways securitization impedes renegoti-
ation and implicitly assumes that portfolio lenders face no institutional impediments, but
this is not realistic. Portfolio lenders complain about accounting rules, including the need
to identify modiﬁcations, even when the borrowers are current prior to the modiﬁcation,
as “troubled debt restructurings”, which leads to reduction of the amount of Tier II cap-
ital and increased scrutiny from investors and cumbersome accounting requirements. The
shortage of qualiﬁed staﬀ, an oft-head complaint from borrowers seeking renegotiation, af-
fects servicers of portfolio loans and private label loans equally. Finally, the interests of the
managers of a loan portfolio are not necessarily any more likely to be aligned with their
investors than are the interests of the trustees of a mortgage pool; many have attributed
the catastrophic failures of ﬁnancial institutions like AIG in 2008 to misaligned incentives
of managers and shareholders.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that securitization does impede rene-
gotiation but that a diﬀerent set of impediments leads to similar problems with portfolio
loans and generates our ﬁnding that there is no diﬀerence. However, the small diﬀerences
would represent a remarkable coincidence.8 More importantly, the low overall levels of
renegotiation mean that even if contract frictions cut the overall number of concessionary
modiﬁcations in half, 94 percent of seriously delinquent borrowers would still fail to receive
a concessionary modiﬁcation. So the puzzle remains why so few loans are renegotiated.
If contract frictions are not a signiﬁcant problem, then what is the explanation for
8Yet another possible explanation is that equal treatment provisions in PSAs force servicers to modify
similar numbers of portfolio and private-label loans and that servicers are reluctant to modify portfolio
loans in spite of the fact that they internalize the beneﬁts because they must then modify private label
loans for which they don’t.
6why lenders do not renegotiate with delinquent borrowers more often? We argue for a
very mundane explanation: lenders expect to recover more from foreclosure than from a
modiﬁed loan. This may seem surprising, given the large losses lenders typically incur
in foreclosure, which include both the diﬀerence between the value of the loan and the
collateral, and the substantial legal expenses associated with the conveyance. The problem
is that renegotiation exposes lenders to two types of risks that can dramatically increase its
cost. The ﬁrst is what we will call “self-cure” risk. As we mentioned above, more than 30
percent of seriously delinquent borrowers “cure” without receiving a modiﬁcation; if taken
at face value, this means that, in expectation, 30 percent of the money spent on a given
modiﬁcation is wasted. The second cost comes from borrowers who redefault; our results
show that a large fraction of borrowers who receive modiﬁcations end up back in serious
delinquency within six months. For them, the lender has simply postponed foreclosure; in a
world with rapidly falling house prices, the lender will now recover even less in foreclosure.
In addition, a borrower who faces a high likelihood of eventually losing the home will do
little or nothing to maintain the house or may even contribute to its deterioration, again
reducing the expected recovery by the lender.
In Section 4 of the paper, we formalize the basic intuition of the investor renegotiation
decision, with a simple model. We show that higher cure rates, higher redefault rates, higher
expectations of house price depreciation, and a higher discount rate all make renegotiation
less attractive to the investor. Thus, one cannot evaluate a modiﬁcation by simply com-
paring the reduction in the interest rate on the loan or in the principal balance with the
expected loss in foreclosure. One must take into account both the redefault and the self-cure
risks, something that most proponents of modiﬁcation fail to do.9
To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to estimate directly the likelihood of renegoti-
ation of private-label and portfolio-held loans. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2009) address the
question of the eﬀects of securitization on renegotiation, but rather than directly identify-
ing renegotiation, they run “black-box” foreclosure regressions using LPS data and argue
that observed diﬀerences in foreclosure rates imply diﬀerences in renegotiation activity. Our
results contradict this interpretation. For renegotiation to explain the diﬀerences in foreclo-
sure rates, there would have to be large errors in our algorithm for identifying renegotiation,
and those errors would have to be signiﬁcantly biased toward portfolio loans, a possibility
that is particularly problematic given that the renegotiations we focus on are precisely the
type that PSAs supposedly prevent. In addition, most of the loan histories in the LPS
9Many proponents of aggressive modiﬁcation take into account redefault risk, and the MHA plan did
address it by providing some insurance against further house price declines to investors who modiﬁed loans.
However, none of the main proponents ever mentions self-cure risk, even though it is well-known in the
industry, see: http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2008/09/loan-modiﬁcations-anecdotes-and-data.html.
7sample are right-censored, meaning that the borrowers have neither lost their homes nor
paid oﬀ their mortgages when the data end, making it impossible to equate the absence
of a foreclosure with successful renegotiation. By contrast, a “cure” is a necessary condi-
tion for renegotiation, and thus the diﬀerences we report in cure rates across portfolio and
private-label loans that are neither large nor of consistent sign contradict the claim that
securitization is a major obstacle to renegotiation.
The implications of our research for policy are three-fold. First, “safe harbor” provisions,
which shelter servicers from investor lawsuits, are unlikely to aﬀect the number of modiﬁca-
tions and should have little eﬀect. Second, and more broadly, the number of “preventable
foreclosures” may be far fewer than many believe.
Finally, we point out that while our model shows why investors may not want to per-
form modiﬁcations, that does not necessarily imply that modiﬁcations may not be socially
optimal. One key input to our theoretical model is the discount rate, and it is possible
that investors, especially in a time when liquidity is highly valued, may be less patient than
society as a whole, and therefore foreclose when society would prefer renegotiation. Large
ﬁnancial incentives to investors or even to borrowers to continue payment could mitigate
this problem.
1.1 Related Literature and Existing Evidence
Our research draws on existing literature in several diﬀerent ﬁelds. First, there has been
substantial interest in the question of renegotiation of home mortgages among real estate
economists, both prior to, and as a result of the current crisis. Riddiough and Wyatt (1994a),
Riddiough and Wyatt (1994b), and Ambrose and Capone (1996) addressed informational
issues that inhibit eﬃcient renegotiation. We draw extensively on this research in Section 4.
Springer and Waller (1993), in an early example, explores patterns in the use of forbearance
as a loss mitigation tool. Capone (1996) and Cutts and Green (2005) both discuss the
institutional issues, with the former study providing historical evidence and focusing on
issues in the mid-1990s, and the latter study discussing innovations since then.
The start of the subprime crisis in 2007 led to a resurgence of interest in the topic among
real estate economists and aroused new interest from other ﬁelds, in particular, the ﬁeld of
law. In real estate, Quercia, Ding, and Ratcliﬀe (2009), Cutts and Merrill (2008), Stegman,
Quercia, Ratcliﬀe, Ding, Davis, Li, Ernst, Aurand, and Van Zandt (2007), and Mason
(2007), all discuss issues with contemporary loss mitigation approaches. Legal researchers,
White (2008) and White (2009), for example, have addressed empirical questions about the
frequency and characteristics of loan modiﬁcations, closely related to the analysis in this
8paper. In addition, they have also looked at issues related to the restrictions imposed by
contracts (Hunt 2009 and Gelpern and Levitin 2009) and the interactions among foreclosure,
renegotiation, and personal bankruptcy (Levitin 2009a and Levitin 2009b).
More broadly, real estate economists have explored the factors that lead delinquent
mortgages to transition to foreclosure or to cure, one of which is renegotiation. Pre-crisis
papers include Ambrose and Capone (1998), Ambrose, Buttimer Jr, and Capone (1997),
Ambrose and Capone (2000), Lauria, Baxter, and Bordelon (2004), Danis and Pennington-
Cross (2005), Pennington-Cross (2009), and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2006). Mulherin
and Muller (1987) discusses conﬂicts between mortgage insurers and owners that may lead
servicers to induce or postpone foreclosure ineﬃciently. In light of the crisis, Piskorski, Seru,
and Vig (2009) and Cordell, Dynan, Lehnert, Liang, and Mauskopf (2008a) have revisited
the question.
The issue of dispersed ownership and debt renegotiation has received a fair amount of
attention in the corporate ﬁnance literature. Gan and Mayer (2006), for example, focus
on commercial mortgages, and ﬁnd that servicers delay liquidation of delinquent mortgages
when they are also the holders of the equity tranche of the deal. This suggests that partici-
pating in the losses due to liquidation may alleviate some of the agency problems posed by
the separation of ownership and servicing pointed out before. However, it may also lead to
conﬂicts of interest between holders of diﬀerent tranches. In their setting, Gan and Mayer
(2006) ﬁnd that the servicers’ behavior is consistent with asset substitution, as servicers
seek to beneﬁt from the option-like payoﬀ of their position. Also, the contractual restric-
tions imposed by PSAs (discussed above) and standard economic arguments on the eﬀects
of dispersed ownership of debt (as in Bolton and Scharfstein 1996 and Asquith, Gertner,
and Scharfstein 1994) further reduce the incentives of servicers to modify mortgages.
2 Data
We use a dataset constructed by LPS. This is a loan-level dataset that covers approximately
60 percent of the U.S. mortgage market and contains detailed information on the character-
istics of both purchase-money mortgages and mortgages used to reﬁnance existing debt.10
This dataset is especially useful in the context of this paper, as it includes both securitized
mortgages and loans held in portfolio.11 The LPS data speciﬁcally denote whether a mort-
10We use a 10 percent random sample of the LPS data when estimating all of our empirical models. The
dataset is simply too big to use in its entirety from a computational standpoint. However, we have checked
the robustness of our results to using diﬀerent sample sizes, and we do not ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences.
11For a more detailed discussion of the LPS data, we direct the reader to Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and
Willen (2009).
9gage is held in portfolio, or securitized by a non-agency, private institution.12 If institutional
constraints are restricting the modiﬁcation process for private-label, securitized loans, we
would expect to see relatively few modiﬁcations among them, as compared to portfolio
loans. Unfortunately, our LPS sample does not include direct information regarding loan
modiﬁcations.13 However, LPS does provide monthly updates to loan terms, so it is possible
to identify loan modiﬁcations indirectly (and imperfectly). Table 1 shows two examples of
modiﬁcations in the data. In the ﬁrst example, the servicer cuts the interest rate, capitalizes
arrears into the balance of the loan, and extends the term of the loan to 40 years. In the
second example, the servicer just capitalizes arrears into the balance of the loan. In both
cases the loan is reported as “current” after the modiﬁcation, whereas before it was 90+
days delinquent.
We denote a loan as being modiﬁed if there is a change in its terms that was not stipulated
by the initial terms of the contract. Such modiﬁcations include interest-rate reductions,
principal-balance reductions, and term extensions. We can also identify principal-balance
and mortgage-payment increases that reﬂect the addition of arrears into the balance of a
loan.14 We spell out our algorithm for identifying modiﬁcations in more detail in Appendix
A.
There are two potential mistakes we can make in this exercise. First, we may falsely
identify modiﬁcations (“false positives”) because of measurement error in the data (for
example, a mistake in the updated balance or interest rate) or some endogenous behavior
on the part of the borrower (for example, a borrower making extra principal payments).
Second, we could miss modiﬁcations (“false negatives”) because our algorithm for ﬁnding
modiﬁcations is incomplete. In order to test our algorithm, we use data from the Columbia
ﬁles put together by Wells Fargo’s CTSLink service. This dataset includes a similar set
of variables to those in the LPS dataset (on performace of the loans and characteristics of
the borrower at origination) but is limited to private-label loans. These ﬁles do include,
12The LPS data also denote when a loan is securitized by a GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprise)
such as Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. We eliminate this class of loans, since the GSEs hold all credit risk,
and thus are not subject to any modiﬁcation restrictions.
13In a recent report, the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision (OTS), in collaboration with the Oﬃce of the Comp-
troller of Currency (OCC), used data from LPS to analyze the outcomes of recent mortgage modiﬁcation
programs (OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report, Third Quarter 2008). In this report, they had access
to supplementary data from servicers that include the identiﬁcation of loans in the LPS data that had been
modiﬁed. We have not been able to obtain access to this data.
14One of the major types of loan modiﬁcations that we are largely unable to identify are interest rate
freezes for subprime ARMs, which reset after two or three years. However, the reason that we cannot
identify those freezes is because many are not binding; the fully-indexed rate is lower than the initial rate.
These modiﬁcations will have no major eﬀect on the current terms of the mortgage, so we do not view this
as a major drawback.
10however, explicit ﬂags for modiﬁcations. This allows us to use the same algorithm described
in Appendix A and compare the modiﬁcations we identify to the “true” modiﬁcations.
Results are reported in Table 2. Overall our algorithm performs well, with 17 percent false
negatives (that is, we do not identify around 17 percent of the “true” modiﬁcations) and
around the same percentage of false positives (that is, approximately 17 percent of the
modiﬁcations we identify are not ﬂagged as modiﬁcations on the CTSLink data). By type
of modiﬁcation, our algorithm performs best for principal reductions, term increases, and
ﬁxed-rate mortgage reductions, and comparatively worse for ARM rate reductions and for
principal increases.
2.1 Summary Statistics from the Data
Table 3 reports the number of modiﬁcations performed each quarter from the ﬁrst quarter
of 2007 through the ﬁnal quarter of 2008, disaggregated by the type of modiﬁcation. Each
of the numbers is a multiple of 10 because we used a 10 percent random sample and scaled
up the numbers we found. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 simply reports the total number
of loan modiﬁcations made. Not surprisingly, modiﬁcations have become more common
as the housing market has weakened. There appear to be more than 7–8 times as many
modiﬁcations performed in the fourth quarter of 2008 as in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007. In
addition to the rapid growth in loan modiﬁcations, the composition of modiﬁcations has
changed over time. This can be seen in the remaining columns of Table 3, which list the
incidence of modiﬁcations of diﬀerent types.15
An interesting ﬁnding is that most modiﬁcations entailed increases in the principal bal-
ance of a mortgage. Such increases are likely due to the addition of arrears to the outstanding
mortgage balance for delinquent borrowers, and these often increase the monthly mortgage
payment by a nontrivial amount. While the absolute numbers of balance-increasing modi-
ﬁcations are still rising, they are falling as a percentage of total modiﬁcations. In the last
few quarters, interest-rate reductions, which necessarily involve a decrease in the monthly
mortgage payment, have become more frequent, rising to more than 26 percent of all modiﬁ-
cations performed in 2008:Q4. Table 3 provides further information regarding the behavior
of monthly mortgage payments for loans that have undergone a modiﬁcation. There are sev-
eral notable patterns in this table. First, as of 2008:Q4, modiﬁcations that involved payment
decreases were more common than those that involved payment increases. Furthermore, the
15In many cases a mortgage will experience multiple types of modiﬁcations at the same time. For
example, we see cases in the data in which the interest rate is decreased and at the same time the term of
the loan is extended. Thus, the percentages in Table 3 are not calculated with respect to the number of
loans modiﬁed, but rather with respect to the number of modiﬁcations performed.
11average and median magnitude of payment decreases has recently increased in our sample.
From 2007:Q1 to 2008:Q2, the median payment decrease ranged from approximately 10
percent to 14 percent, but then increased to approximately 20 percent and 22 percent in
2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4, respectively. Based on the logic from our simple framework above,
it is likely that these will have more success than modiﬁcations involving increases in the
payment and/or balance.
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is that the incidence of principal reductions
is quite low in our data. This is likely due to two factors. First, the LPS dataset under-
represents the subprime mortgage market.16 A few servicers that focus almost exclusively
on subprime mortgages have recently begun modiﬁcation programs that involve principal
reduction.17 In addition, from a theoretical perspective, principal reduction plans suﬀer from
the severe incomplete-information problem noted earlier. Balance reductions are appealing
to both borrowers in danger of default and those who are not. In a recent paper, we
argued that to avoid such moral hazard concerns, lenders have a strong incentive to only
provide modiﬁcations to those borrowers who are most likely to default.18 Table 3 contains
summary statistics regarding the characteristics at origination of both the sample of modiﬁed
mortgages and the sample of all loans in the LPS dataset. The patterns that emerge from the
table are consistent with such an argument. We discuss this point in more detail below. The
sample of modiﬁed mortgages is characterized by substantially lower credit scores, higher
loan-to-value (ltv) ratios, and slightly higher debt-to-income ratios. The discrepancy in ltv
ratios may be underestimated, as the percentage of mortgages with an ltv ratio of exactly
80 percent is signiﬁcantly higher in the modiﬁcation sample than in the full sample. As we
argued above, this likely implies a larger fraction of highly leveraged loans, for which the
second liens are not observable in the data. In addition, the modiﬁcation sample includes a
higher fraction of mortgages with non-traditional amortization schedules, such as interest-
only loans, option ARMS, hybrid ARMs, and subprime loans.
In Table 4 we compare the size of payment decrease and payment increase modiﬁcations
for loans held in private-label trusts and loans held in portfolio. The results are somewhat
mixed, as the size (as a percentage of the original payment) of the median payment decrease
due to modiﬁcation is larger for private-label loans in the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008, but
smaller in the ﬁnal quarter. We see a similar pattern for the median payment increase due
16The majority of subprime mortgages are securitized by non-agency ﬁrms, and the LPS dataset includes
approximately 35 percent of mortgages securitized by non-agency corporations.
17According to an October report by Credit Suisse, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Litton Loan Ser-
vicing LP were the only subprime servicers that had performed a nontrivial number of principal reduction
modiﬁcations. Neither of these servicers contributes to the LPS dataset.
18See Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) for a more detailed discussion.
12to modiﬁcation, while the diﬀerences are small for the mean and median payment increase.
3 Diﬀerences in Modiﬁcation Behavior
In this section, we directly address the question of whether the incidence of modiﬁcation
is impeded by the process of securitization. We show evidence that private-label loans
and portfolio loans perform similarly, both unconditionally and when observable diﬀerences
between securitized and portfolio-held loans are controlled for, using both a logit model
with a 12-month horizon and a Cox proportional hazard model that takes into account the
problem of right censoring in the data.
To make sure that our results are robust to the type of modiﬁcation performed, we
use several diﬀerent deﬁnitions of modiﬁcation in this section. Our ﬁrst measure is the
number of concessionary modiﬁcations, which we deﬁne as reductions in the interest rate,
reductions in the principal balance, extensions of the term, or combinations of all three.
Any or a combination of these serves to reduce a borrower’s monthly mortgage payment.
We use this as our primary deﬁnition of modiﬁcation in our analysis, as there is a consensus
among most market observers that concessionary modiﬁcations are the most, or perhaps the
only, eﬀective way of preventing foreclosures. Because pooling and servicing agreements,
which govern the conduct of servicers when loans are securitized, often limit modiﬁcations
that change any of the contract terms (not just those that result in payment decreases), we
broaden our deﬁnition of renegotiation to include any modiﬁcation, regardless of whether
it lowers the borrower’s payment. As we discussed above, many, and in some subsets, most
modiﬁcations, involve the capitalization of arrears into the balance of the loan and thus lead
to increased payments. Finally, we attempt to include in our measure of renegotiation the
number of times that lenders allow borrowers to extinguish their liabilities by repaying less
than the outstanding balance of the loan. These transactions are known as short payoﬀs,
short sales, or deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, depending on the structure. We do this by
counting the number of seriously delinquent loans that the servicer reports as paid oﬀ, and
including these observations in our deﬁnition of modiﬁcation.
Before turning to the regressions, however, it is instructive to look at the unconditional
frequencies of modiﬁcations in the data. Panel A of Table 5 shows the unconditional fre-
quencies for each type of investor. The ﬁrst takeaway from the table is the extremely low
percentages of modiﬁcations for both types of mortgages. Only 3 percent of 60-day delin-
quent loans received concessionary modiﬁcations in the 12 months following the ﬁrst serious
delinquency, and only 8.5 percent of the delinquent loans received any type of modiﬁcation
in the same period. These are extremely low levels of modiﬁcations, and they suggest that
13even if there are contract frictions that are preventing modiﬁcations in securitized trusts,
the economic eﬀects are small. The second takeaway from the table is that the uncondi-
tional diﬀerences between portfolio loans and private-label loans are very small in absolute
terms. There is a diﬀerence of approximately 0.6 percentage points and 0.3 percentage
points for concessionary modiﬁcations and all modiﬁcations, respectively. These are very
small diﬀerences, and they suggest that contract frictions do not play an important role
in inhibiting the renegotiation process for loans in securitized trusts. However, these are
unconditional statistics, and it is possible that once observable diﬀerences in the charac-
teristics of each type of loan and borrower are accounted for, the results may change.19
Thus, we now estimate diﬀerences in modiﬁcation behavior while controlling for observable
loan and borrower characteristics. These characteristics include the contract interest rate
at origination; the credit score of the borrower at origination; the loan-to-value ratio of the
mortgage (not including second or third liens) at origination20; the logarithm of the nominal
dollar amount of loan; an indicator of whether the purpose of the loan was a reﬁnance of a
previous mortgage or a home purchase; an indicator of whether the loan was considered to
be subprime21; a measure of the amount of equity in the property at the time of delinquency,
speciﬁed as a percentage of the original loan balance and updated by state-level house price
indexes calculated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)22 (and an indicator for
a borrower who is in a position of negative equity at the time of delinquency, where the
value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the home); and the unemployment rate of the
county in which the borrower resides, calculated by the Burea of Labor Services (BLS).23
We also include, but do not show because of space considerations, a set of cohort dummies
that control for the quarter when the mortgage was originated, information regarding the
amortization schedule of the mortgage (interest-only or negative amortization, including
mortgages commonly referred to as option ARMs), an indicator for whether the size of
the mortgage is greater than the GSE conforming loan limits, an indicator for whether the
19For example, if private-label loans are signiﬁcantly riskier, and thus better candidates for modiﬁcation
on average, then the unconditional diﬀerence will signiﬁcantly understate things.
20Because of the lack of information on second liens in the LPS data and the prevalence of second
mortgages as a way to avoid paying mortgage insurance, we include an indicator variable if the ltv ratio
is exactly equal to 80 percent. These are the borrowers who likely took out second mortgages, as the
requirement for mortgage insurance occurs at ltv ratios above 80 percent. Our experience with other, more
complete datasets also conﬁrms that many of these borrowers are likely to have second mortgages that bring
the cumulative ltv ratio up to 100 percent.
21This deﬁnition of subprime comes from the mortgage servicers that contribute to the LPS dataset.
22House prices are measured at the state level using the FHFA index. We also tried using Case-Shiller
metropolitan area house price indexes and found no substantive diﬀerences. We chose to use the OFHEO
prices for our primary speciﬁcations because of their greater sample coverage.
23Equity and periods of unemployment are very important determinants of a borrower’s decision to
default, and thus should also be important factors in the modiﬁcation decision.
14house is a primary residence, an indicator for adjustable rate mortgages that contain a reset
provision (so-called “hybrid ARMs”), and, ﬁnally, an indicator for a borrower who does not
use the corresponding property as a principal residence (this includes both properties used
strictly for investment purposes, and vacation homes).
3.1 Canonical Speciﬁcation Results
Panel B of Table 5 displays the estimated marginal eﬀects from a set of logit models for
the three diﬀerent types of modiﬁcation deﬁnitions. The dependent variable is 1 if a 60-day
deliquent loan is modiﬁed at any point in the 12 months following the ﬁrst delinquency. The
ﬁrst column considers payment-reducing (concessionary) modiﬁcations, the second column
includes both payment-reducing and payment-increasing modiﬁcations, and the third col-
umn contains all modiﬁcations considered before, as well as prepayments. In all regressions,
the group of portfolio-held loans is omitted from the estimation and is thus assumed to be
the reference group. We cluster the standard errors at the zip code level to account for the
fact that loans in the same geographical area are likely to suﬀer correlated (unobserved)
shocks.
According to the estimates in the ﬁrst column, private-label loans were approximately
0.3 percentage points less likely to receive concessionary modiﬁcations than loans held in
portfolio. This estimate is economically small but statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level. When we consider all modiﬁcations the point estimate ﬂips sign and becomes 0.2
percentage points (statistically insigniﬁcant), while for the third speciﬁcation, private-label
loans were actually 0.9 percentage points more likely to receive concessionary modiﬁcations
(statistically signiﬁcant). As discussed above, all of these speciﬁcations include a number
of additional loan characteristics that are important in the underwriting process and, thus,
likely to play an important role in the modiﬁcation decision. The ﬁrst observation to make
regarding the results reported in Panel B is that the diﬀerence between the incidence of
modiﬁcation for portfolio-held loans and private-label loans becomes even smaller when
these variables are controlled for in the estimation. The results also imply that loans with
higher credit scores were modiﬁed less, loans with higher ltv ratios were modiﬁed less,
larger loans were modiﬁed more, and loans with more equity at the time of delinquency
were modiﬁed less. We ﬁnd a sizeable diﬀerence in terms of the frequency of modiﬁcation
for both reﬁnances and subprime loans. Conditional on being 60-days delinquent, subprime
loans were modiﬁed about 2 percentage points more than prime loans. We estimate a model
separately for subprime loans in Table 6.
Censoring is an important issue for any sample of mortgages, as there are currently
15many delinquent loans that are, or will soon be, good candidates for modiﬁcation, as the
housing market continues to decline. For this reason, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard
model of the transition from serious delinquency to modiﬁcation. The Cox model is very
common in the survival analysis literature, and it has the advantage of being both ﬂexible
in terms of functional form considerations, as the baseline hazard function can be treated
as an incidental parameter, and easy to estimate in terms of computational considerations.
The results, expressed as hazard ratios, are reported in Panel C. A hazard ratio less than
1 indicates that private-label loans were less likely to receive a modiﬁcation compared to
portfolio loans, while a ratio greater than 1 signiﬁes the opposite. The estimates are con-
sistent with what we report for the logits in the previous panel. Private-label loans were
less likely to receive concessionary modiﬁcations, but this coeﬃcient estimate is statistically
insigniﬁcant. For the our other two modiﬁcation deﬁnitions the sign ﬂips, but again the
result is not statistically signiﬁcant. All three speciﬁcations include the same covariates
that were included in the logit models.
3.2 Subsample Results
Table 6 contains further logit estimation results for various subsamples of interest to see if
there are diﬀerent probabilities than in the full sample. Since the subprime indicator seems
to be such a powerful predictor of modiﬁcation conditional on serious delinquency in Table 5,
we report the estimated marginal eﬀects for only the sample of subprime loans in the second
column of Table 6. The subprime sample also has the advantage that the agencies (Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac) were unlikely to be the marginal investor for this type of loans, so it
is less likely that the portfolio and private-label samples diﬀer signiﬁcantly on unobservable
characteristics. In the third column, we report results from the sample of LPS mortgages
for which the borrower had a FICO score of less than 620, since automated underwriting
systems generally instruct lenders to engage in increased scrutiny for such loans because
of increased default risk. In the fourth and ﬁfth columns, we focus on samples of loans
that we believe contain the most information regarding the borrowers, in order to try to
minimize the amount of unobservable heterogeneity that could potentially be biasing the
results. In the fourth column, we focus on the sample of loans for which both the DTI ratio
and the documentation status contain non-missing values, while the ﬁfth column contains
results for only the loans that were fully documented (in terms of income and assets) at
origination. Panel A contains both unconditional means and estimated marginal eﬀects for
concessionary modiﬁcations, while Panel B contains results for the broader deﬁnition that
also includes non-concessionary modiﬁcations.
16The results are largely consistent with those contained in Table 5. We redisplay the re-
sults from the full sample in the ﬁrst column of Table 6 for ease of comparison. The diﬀerence
in modiﬁcation frequency between private-label and portfolio-held, subprime mortgages for
60-day delinquent loans is small, and not statistically diﬀerent from zero for both deﬁnitions
of modiﬁcation. Using a FICO cutoﬀ of 620 as an alternative deﬁnition of subprime does
not seem to make much diﬀerence. The unconditional means are smaller (for both types of
loans) compared to the LPS subprime sample, as the LPS deﬁnition includes most of the
loans with a FICO less than 620, but also some loans with higher associated FICOs. How-
ever, the marginal eﬀects of private-label loans estimated from the logit models are quite
similar to those from the LPS subprime sample, as they are economically small, and not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Finally, we also ﬁnd small and largely insigniﬁcant results for the last
two subsamples, displayed in the fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 6. Although, it is worth
pointing out that we do ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant, positive estimate of private-label
loans for the broad deﬁnition of modiﬁcation (Panel B).
3.3 Alternative Delinquency Deﬁnition
As an additional robustness check, we broaden our deﬁnition of delinquency and focus
on modiﬁcations performed on loans subsequent to their ﬁrst 30-day delinquency, which
corresponds to one missed mortgage payment. While waiting until a borrower becomes
seriously delinquent (deﬁned as 60-days) to renegotiate is common practice in the servicing
industry, there are no direct contractual stipulations (to our knowledge) that restrict a
servicer from modifying the loan of a borrower who is 30-days delinquent. Thus, in Table
7 we repeat our analysis of Tables 5 and 6, but condition on 30-days delinquency rather
than 60-days. The table contains three panels of estimation results, one for each of our
modiﬁcation deﬁnitions, and all of the subsamples described considered in Table 6. The
unconditional means, logit marginal eﬀects, and Cox hazard ratios are all reported for each
combination of subsample and modiﬁcation deﬁnition.
The results are very similar to those from the analysis of 60-day delinquent loans. Ac-
cording to the full sample and subprime sample logit models, portfolio loans received slightly
more concessionary modiﬁcations, and the diﬀerences (0.3 and 0.5 percentage points respec-
tively) are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. However, according to the subprime
sample and full documentation sample Cox models, private-label loans actually received
more concessionary modiﬁcations, although those diﬀerences are also small.24 The results
24The logit marginal eﬀects correspond to percentage point diﬀerences, while the Cox hazard ratios
correspond to percent diﬀerences. If one expresses the logit marginal eﬀects as a percent change of the
unconditional means, those percent changes are very similar in magnitude to the Cox results.
17for our second modiﬁcation deﬁnition are similar, although we ﬁnd more evidence of statis-
tically signiﬁcant, positive diﬀerences between the incidence of portfolio and private-level
modiﬁcations. The samples of portfolio loans with non-missing information for DTI and
documentation status were modiﬁed more often than the corresponding sample of private-
label loans, but the magnitudes are still relatively small (10 to 20 percent diﬀerence from
the unconditional mean). Finally, in Panel C, we see strong evidence for both the logit and
Cox speciﬁcations, that delinquent private-label loans prepayed more often than portfolio
loans. The diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant for every one of the subsamples.
3.4 Redefault Probabilities and Cure Rates
In the previous subsections, we showed that there is little diﬀerence in the frequency of
mortgage loan modiﬁcations between servicers of loans held in a private trust versus loans
held in portfolio. There are two potential reasons that may explain the failure of those exer-
cises to pick up important diﬀerences in servicer behavior that may truly exist. First, it may
be that contract frictions in securitization trusts do not result in substantial diﬀerences in
the frequency of modiﬁcations (the extensive margin) but do result in signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the intensive margin, with respect to the types of modiﬁcations performed, the extent to
which contract terms are modiﬁed, and, more broadly, the care or eﬀort expended in each
modiﬁcation by private-label servicers compared to that expended by portfolio servicers.
Second, there may be a type of renegotiation that our algorithm does not identify, but that
is used to a large extent in loss mitigation eﬀorts and used diﬀerently by servicers of private-
label loans than by servicers of portfolio loans. For example, forms of forbearance, which
are often called repayment plans in the industry, would not be picked up by our algorithm.25
In this subsection, we use the LPS data to attempt to address these possibilities.
We perform two separate empirical exercises to address each of these concerns in turn.
First, we compare redefault rates of private-label modiﬁed loans with those of portfolio mod-
iﬁed loans. We deﬁne redefault as a loan that is 60 days delinquent or more, in foreclosure
process or already foreclosed and now owned by the lender (REO for “real-estate-owned”)
six months after the time of the modiﬁcation. If there are important diﬀerences in the man-
ner by which servicers of private-label loans modify mortgages relative to the foreclosure
procedures of servicers of portfolio loans, then we would expect to see signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the subsequent performance of modiﬁed loans.
Second, to address the possibility that our algorithm misses an important aspect of
25However, as we argued above, PSAs do not contain restrictions on repayment plans, because they do
not involve changing the terms of the mortgage. Thus, we would argue that diﬀerences in forbearance
behavior that might exist could not be the result of contract frictions in securitization trusts.
18renegotiation, we compare the cure rates of seriously delinquent, private-label loans to those
of seriously delinquent portfolio loans. The idea behind this exercise is that any appreciable
diﬀerence in servicer renegotiation behavior will manifest itself in diﬀerences in cure rates.
It is important to stress however, that diﬀerences in servicer renegotiation behavior are only
one potential explanation for diﬀerences that may exist in cure rates. To put this idea in the
terms of logical reasoning, diﬀerences in cure rates are a necessary condition for signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in renegotiation behavior, but they are not a suﬃcient condition.
Table 8 contains the results of the redefault analysis. The ﬁrst observation to note from
the table is that the unconditional probability that a modiﬁed mortgage redefaults in this
six-month period is very large, at about 20–40 percent for payment-reducing modiﬁcations
(Panel A), and 40–50 percent for all modiﬁcations (Panel B). We argue below that the high
level of redefault rates could explain why we observe so few modiﬁcations — very often
they do not lead to successful outcomes even as little as six months after the modiﬁcation.
The second observation to note is that there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the redefault rates of private-label loans and those of portfolio loans, once the observable
characteristics of the mortgages are taken into account (this is valid for all of the subsam-
ples). These results, combined with the statistics displayed in Table 4 suggest that there are
no substantial diﬀerences in either the type of modiﬁcation employed or in the care/eﬀort
expended by the two types of servicers.
Table 9 shows the results of logit models for the probability that a seriously delinquent
loan subsequently cures. Our deﬁnition of a cure is that the loan is either current, 30-days
delinquent, or prepaid after 12 months following the ﬁrst 60-day delinquency. The ﬁrst
important point to make is that the unconditional cure probabilities are large (around 30
percent). Given that the unconditional modiﬁcation probability is about 8 percent, this
means that many loans cure without any intervention on the part of servicers. The second
important observation to note in this table is that the cure probabilities for portfolio loans
and private-label loans are quite similar. The unconditional cure probability is smaller by
about 4.4 percentage points for private-label loans in the whole sample, but that is reduced
to only 2.2 percentage points (statistically signiﬁcant) when we control for observable char-
acteristics of the loans and borrowers. We also include results for the subsamples of interest
in columns 2–5. For each of the subsamples the sign of the diﬀerence actually reverses, as
private-label loans were more likely to cure (the marginal eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant,
with the exception of the FICO < 620 sample). This is an important robustness check,
as we argued above that unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be less of a problem in the
subsamples (especially for the non-missing documentation status and DTI ratios sample
and the full documentation sample). Thus, the change in the sign of the diﬀerences in
19cure rates between private-label servicers and portfolio servicers suggests that unobserved
heterogeneity between the two loan types plays an important role.
4 Understanding the Empirical Results
If securitization does not block renegotiation, then why is it so rare? In this section, we
build a simple model of the renegotiation decision, which, in a stylized way, mirrors the
net present value (NPV) calculation that servicers are supposed to perform when deciding
whether to oﬀer a borrower a modiﬁcation. We show that servicer uncertainty about whether
the borrower will redefault even after successful renegotiation or uncertainty about whether
the borrower will cure without renegotiation can dramatically aﬀect the NPV calculation,
ruining what a naive observer might think of as a “win-win” deal for the borrower and
lender. While many proponents of modiﬁcation are aware of the former problem, “redefault
risk,” none seem to be aware of the latter problem, which we call “self-cure risk.”
In addition to the model, we also provide institutional evidence in this section that
supports our arguments and ﬁndings above. This includes evidence of low modiﬁcation
frequencies in previous housing busts, well before the advent of securitization trusts; the
equal treatment provision statements contained in the PSAs, which direct the servicer to
behave as if it was in fact the investor of the mortgage-backed security and thus the owner
of the mortgages; and ﬁnally, the absence of lawsuits to date directed at servicers by in-
vestors in mortgage-backed securities, which one would expect to ﬁnd if modiﬁcations were
unambiguously better than foreclosures from an NPV calculation.
4.1 A Simple Model of Loss Mitigation
We consider a simple model of a lender’s decision to modify a delinquent loan.26 There
are three periods: t = 0,1,2. The borrower owes a mortgage payment of size m at time 1
and is due to repay the loan balance M in period 2. The mortgage is collateralized by a
house, which is worth P1 and P2 in periods 1 and 2, respectively. In period 0, the lender has
to make a decision to either modify the loan, or do nothing. If the lender fails to modify
the loan, then, with probability α0, the borrower will default in period 1, and the lender
will foreclose and recover P1 − λ, where λ is the cost of foreclosing on the property. If the
borrower does not default next period, then the lender receives the periodic payment m in
period 1, and the borrower repays the loan in full in period 2. The value to the lender of
26Our model shares some basic similarities with the approach in Ambrose and Capone (1996), who also
identify a role for self-cure risk in assessing the proﬁtability of a loss mitigation action.
20the loan without modiﬁcation equals the present discounted value of the cash ﬂow:
α0 ∗ max[(P1 − λ),M] + (1 − α0)[m + (1/R)M], (1)
where we ignore discounting for the ﬁrst period because there is no income in period 0. If
the lender modiﬁes the loan, then we assume that the borrower makes a reduced periodic
payment m∗ in period 1 with certainty, but then either defaults with probability α1 or repays
a modiﬁed amount M∗ in period 2. The value to the lender of the modiﬁed loan is:
m
∗ + (1/R)α1 ∗ max[(P2 − λ),M
∗] + (1 − α1)(1/R)M
∗. (2)
Taking the diﬀerence between expressions (2) and (1) yields the following proposition:




∗ − max[(P1 − λ),M]]







R max[(P2 − λ),M
∗] − max[(P1 − λ),M]] > 0. (3)
To interpret equation (3), divide the population of borrowers into three groups. The ﬁrst
group, with mass of α0 − α1 are borrowers who will repay in full with a modiﬁcation but
who will default otherwise. For this group, the investor gains the diﬀerence between the
present value of the modiﬁed repayment m∗ +
1
RM∗ and the recovery given foreclosure,
max[(P1 − λ),M]. The second group, with mass 1 − α0, includes borrowers who will repay
whether or not they receive a modiﬁcation. For this group, the investor loses the diﬀerence
between full repayment and the modiﬁed repayment. Gerardi and Willen (2009) refer to the
ﬁrst two terms as Type I error and Type II error, respectively, in analogy with the statistical
concepts. In this context, Type I error corresponds to the cost of not renegotiating loans that
need modifying, while Type II error corresponds to the cost of modifying loans that would
be repaid in the absence of assistance. The third term, with mass α1, includes borrowers
who will default regardless of whether they receive a modiﬁcation. For these borrowers,
modiﬁcation yields a periodic payment, but postpones foreclosure. Whether this is good or
bad for the lender depends on the evolution of house prices and the rate at which the lender
discounts the cash ﬂow.
To illustrate the implications of the model, we compute some simple comparative statics.
All else being equal, an increase in α0 makes modiﬁcation more attractive to the investor,
while an increase in α1 makes modiﬁcation less attractive. Intuitively, a higher α0 means
21higher Type I error and lower Type II error, and a higher α1 implies higher Type II error.
Since, in general, one would think that α0 and α1 would move in the same direction across
borrowers, it is useful to note that an increase the gap, α0 − α1, makes modiﬁcation more
attractive.
We make three points about the model. First, when looking at the data, it is not
suﬃcient to show that one would recover more from a modiﬁed loan than from foreclosure
ex post, to prove that modiﬁcation is ex ante optimal. To prove that a modiﬁcation makes
sense from the perspective of the lender, one must show that the Type I error, the value
of the modiﬁed loans that would have defaulted, exceeds the Type II error, the value of
the modiﬁed loans that would have paid oﬀ in the absence of modiﬁcation. White (2009),
among many others, focuses entirely on Type I error:
The average loss for the 21,000 ﬁrst mortgages liquidated in November was
$145,000, representing an average loss of 55 percent of the amount due. Losses
on second lien mortgages were close to 100 percent. In comparison, for the
modiﬁed loans with some amount of principal or interest written oﬀ, the average
loss recognized was $23,610. This seven-to-one diﬀerence between foreclosure
losses and modiﬁcation write-oﬀs is striking, and lies at the heart of the failure
of the voluntary mortgage modiﬁcation program. At a minimum, there is room
for servicers to be more generous in writing down debt for the loans they are
modifying, while still recovering far more than from foreclosures in the depressed
real estate market of late 2008. I will consider some of the reasons for this
apparently irrational behavior in a later section.27










With α0 suﬃciently low, modiﬁcation will not make sense. To be clear, our criticism of
White (2009) and others has nothing to do with the possibility that the modiﬁed loan will
default, as we have assumed here that the modiﬁed loan will pay oﬀ in full.
The second point here is that both the rate at which lenders discount future payoﬀs and
the evolution of prices aﬀect the gains to modiﬁcation. For mass (1−α1) of the borrowers,
modiﬁcation will simply delay foreclosure. In that case, the lender will get some extra income
from any mortgage payments the borrower makes before redefaulting, but the lender has to
wait longer to obtain the ﬁnal payout and will get less if prices continue to fall.
27White (2009), p. 14–15
22The third point is that the lender’s information set plays a crucial role here, and one
could argue that it should only contain information outside the control of the borrower.
This would limit the set to the origination characteristics of the loan, prices, and interest
rates. Employment status, income, and marital status all present problems, although they
can be partially overcome—as in the case of unemployment insurance. Delinquency status,
which seems a natural candidate, is a diﬃcult issue. On one hand, a borrower has virtually
complete control over it. On the other hand, it is a costly signal, as a 60-day delinquency
does adversely aﬀect one’s credit history and future access to credit markets. Thus, when
considering ways to design a proﬁtable modiﬁcation program, which implies attempting to
maximize α0 and minimize α1, a lender must restrict its information set to a relatively small
set of variables that are contemporaneously exogenous to the borrower.
4.2 Institutional Evidence
While the results from Section 3 may be surprising to market commentators who believe that
contract frictions inherent in securitization trusts are preventing large-scale modiﬁcation
eﬀorts in mortgage markets, we argue in this section that both historical evidence and
evidence from securitization contracts actually support our ﬁndings.
First, we look at history. If securitization, or more precisely private-label securitization,
inhibits renegotiation, then we would expect that renegotiation would have been common in
the 1990s, when there was little private-label securitization, or in the 1970s, when securiti-
zation itself was rare. But, the historical evidence we have does not bear that out. In 1975,
Touche Ross surveyed loss mitigation activities at savings and loans and found, “Lenders...
were unwilling to either modify loans through extended terms or reﬁnancing to a lower
rate.”28 In the 1990s, a report commissioned by Congress to study foreclosure alternatives,
said, “Along with loan modiﬁcations, long-term forbearance/repayment plans are the most
under utilized foreclosure avoidance tools currently available to the industry.”29
Second, many observers have focused on institutional factors that inhibit loan modiﬁ-
cation when the loan is securitized, but other factors may play a similar role for portfolio
lenders as well. In particular, accounting rules force lenders to take writedowns at the
time of the modiﬁcation (reducing Tier II capital), to identify modiﬁed loans as troubled
debt restructurings (under FAS 15), and also to impose burdensome reporting requirements
on modiﬁed loans including loan-speciﬁc allowances for potential losses (under FAS 114).
Additionally, payments made by borrowers for loans that are subject to “troubled debt re-
28Capone (1996), p. 20–21.
29Capone (1996), p. x.
23structurings” are recognized only as principal repayments and generate to interest income
until the bank can demonstrate that a borrower is “performing.” All of the above account-
ing requirements potentially make modiﬁcations costly for a bank. Downey Financial, for
example, attempted to reﬁnance current borrowers out of risky option ARMs into safer,
ﬁxed-rate instruments and argued that the change should not aﬀect their balance sheet
because the borrowers had never missed payments. However, their accountants viewed the
reﬁnancings as “troubled debt restructurings,” and forced the ﬁrm to restate the share of
nonperforming assets for November 2007 to 5.77 percent from 3.65 percent.30
If modiﬁcations were truly in the best ﬁnancial interest of investors in mortgage-backed-
securities (MBS) as many commentators have alleged, we would expect to see concern on
their part regarding the low levels of modiﬁcations performed to date. But, according to
Cordell, Dynan, Lehnert, Liang, and Mauskopf (2008b), who interviewed a number of MBS
investors, they (the investors) are not concerned that servicers are foreclosing on many
more mortgages than they are modifying. Thus, there does not seem to be much concern
by market participants that either incentives or contract frictions are inhibiting servicers
from performing loan modiﬁcations. The evidence in the literature seems to suggest a
small role for contract frictions in the context of renegotiation. In a 2007 study of a small
sample of PSAs, Credit Suisse found that fewer than 10 percent of the contracts ruled out
modiﬁcations completely, while approximately 40 percent allowed modiﬁcations, but with
quantity restrictions,31 and the rest, about half, contained no restrictions on renegotiation
behavior. Hunt (2009) also analyzed a sample of subprime PSAs and concluded that outright
modiﬁcation bans were extremely rare. A 2008 report by the COP analyzed a number
of securitized mortgage pools with quantity restrictions and concluded that none of the
restrictions were binding. In terms of incentive issues, Hunt (2009) found that most of the
contracts in his sample explicitly instructed the mortgage servicer to behave as if it were
the owner of the pool of the loans:
The most common rules [in making modiﬁcations] are that the servicer must
follow generally applicable servicing standards, service the loans in the interest
of the certiﬁcate holders and/or the trust, and service the loans as it would
service loans held for its own portfolio. Notably, these conditions taken together
can be read as attempting to cause the loans to be serviced as if they had not
been securitized. (p. 8, insertion added)
30http://www.housingwire.com/2008/01/14/downey-ﬁnancial-accounting-rules-suck/
31The quantity restrictions often took the form of a limit (usually 5 percent) on the percentage of
mortgages in the pool that could be modiﬁed without requesting permission from the trustee.
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There is widespread concern that an ineﬃciently low number of mortgages have been mod-
iﬁed during the current crisis, and that this has led to excessive foreclosure levels, leaving
both families and investors worse oﬀ. We use a large dataset that accounts for approximately
60 percent of mortgages in the United States originated between 2005 and 2007, to shed
more light on the determinants of mortgage modiﬁcation, with a special focus on the claim
that delinquent loans have diﬀerent probabilities of renegotiation depending on whether
they are securitized by private institutions or held in a servicer’s portfolio. By comparing
the relative frequency of renegotiation between private-label and portfolio mortgages, we
are able to shed light on the question of whether institutional frictions in the secondary
mortgage market are inhibiting the modiﬁcation process from taking place.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that renegotiation in mortgage markets during this period was indeed
rare. In our full sample of data, approximately 3 percent of the seriously delinquent borrow-
ers received a concessionary modiﬁcation in the year following their ﬁrst serious delinquency,
while fewer than 8 percent received any type of modiﬁcation. These numbers are extremely
low, considering that foreclosure proceedings were initiated on approximately half of the
loans in the sample and completed for almost 30 percent of the sample. Our second ﬁnding
is that a comparison of renegotiation rates for private-label loans and portfolio loans, while
controlling for observable characteristics of loans and borrowers, yields economically small,
and for the most part, statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerences. This ﬁnding holds for a battery
of robustness tests we consider, including various deﬁnitions of modiﬁcation, numerous sub-
samples of the data, including subsamples for which we believe unobserved heterogeneity to
be less of an issue, and consideration of potential diﬀerences along the intensive margin of
renegotiation.
Since we conclude that contract frictions in securitization trusts are not a signiﬁcant
problem, we attempt to reconcile the conventional wisdom held by market commentators,
that modiﬁcations are a win-win proposition from the standpoint of both borrowers and
lenders, with the extraordinarily low levels of renegotiation that we ﬁnd in the data. We
argue that the data are not inconsistent with a situation in which, on average, lenders expect
to recover more from foreclosure than from a modiﬁed loan. At face value, this assertion
may seem implausible, since there are many estimates that suggest the average loss given
foreclosure is much greater than the loss in value of a modiﬁed loan. However, we point
out that renegotiation exposes lenders to two types of risks that are often overlooked by
market observers and that can dramatically increase its cost. The ﬁrst is “self-cure risk,”
which refers to the situation in which a lender renegotiates with a delinquent borrower who
25does not need assistance. This group of borrowers is non-trivial according to our data,
as we ﬁnd that approximately 30 percent of seriously delinquent borrowers “cure” in our
data without receiving a modiﬁcation. The second cost comes from borrowers who default
again after receiving a loan modiﬁcation. We refer to this group as “redefaulters,” and our
results show that a large fraction (between 30 and 45 percent) of borrowers who receive
modiﬁcations, end up back in serious delinquency within six months. For this group, the
lender has simply postponed foreclosure, and, if the housing market continues to decline,
the lender will recover even less in foreclosure in the future.
We believe that our analysis has some important implications for policy. First, “safe har-
bor provisions,” which are designed to shelter servicers from investor lawsuits, are unlikely
to have a material impact on the number of modiﬁcations and thus will not signiﬁcantly de-
crease foreclosures. Second, and more generally, if the presence of self-cure risk and redefault
risk do make renegotiation less appealing to investors, the number of easily “preventable”
foreclosures may be far smaller than many commentators believe.
26A Appendix: Identifying Modiﬁcations in the LPS
Dataset
In this section we discuss in detail the assumptions that we used to identify modiﬁed loans
in the LPS dataset. The LPS dataset is updated on a monthly basis, and the updated data
include both new mortgages originated and a snapshot of the current terms and delinquency
status of outstanding mortgages. Essentially, for a given mortgage, we compare the updated
terms to the terms at origination, as well as the change in terms from the proceeding month,
and if there is a material change over and above the changes stipulated in the mortgage
contract, then we assume that the contract terms of the mortgage have been modiﬁed.
A.1 Interest Rate Reductions
We use a diﬀerent set of rules to identify reduced interest rates for ﬁxed-rate mortgages
(FRM) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM). In principle, identifying a rate change for
an FRM should be easy, since by deﬁnition the rate is ﬁxed for the term of the mortgage.
However, after a detailed inspection of the LPS data, it became apparent that some of the
smaller rate ﬂuctuations were likely due to measurement error rather than to an explicit
modiﬁcation. Thus, we adopt a slightly more complex criterion: The diﬀerence between
the rate at origination and the current rate must be greater than 50 basis points; and the
diﬀerence between the rate in the previous month and the current rate must be greater than
50 basis points; and either the mortgage must be 30-days delinquent with the loan currently
in loss mitigation proceedings (as reported by the servicer) or the diﬀerence between the rate
in the previous month and the current rate must be greater than 300 basis points (which
allows for the possibility that a loan that is current could feasibly qualify for a modiﬁcation).
Identifying interest rate reductions for ARMs is slightly more complicated, since by
deﬁnition the interest rate is variable and can move both up and down. The LPS data
contain the information necessary to ﬁgure out how much the interest rate should move from
month to month. This rate is often referred to as the fully indexed rate, as it is normally
speciﬁed as a ﬁxed spread above a common nominal interest rate. The LPS dataset contains
information regarding the initial rate, the appropriate index rate, and the spread between
the index and the mortgage rate. In addition, the majority of ARMs are characterized by
a period at the beginning of the contract in which the interest rate is held constant (these
mortgages are often referred to as hybrid ARMs). At the end of this period, the interest rate
adjusts (or resets) to a certain spread above an index rate and then subsequently adjusts
at a speciﬁc frequency. The LPS dataset also contains information regarding the length of
27the initial ﬁxed period, enabling us to identify this period in the data and determine the
point at which the interest rate should begin to adjust (we refer to this period as the reset
date). Our criterion for identifying an interest rate reduction for an ARM is as follows:
The diﬀerence between the rate at origination and the current rate must be greater than 50
basis points; and the diﬀerence between the rate in the previous month and the current rate
must be greater than 50 basis points; and if the reset date has passed, then the diﬀerence
between the fully-indexed rate and the current rate must be at least 100 basis points ; and
either the mortgage must be 30-days delinquent with the loan currently in loss mitigation
proceedings (as reported by the servicer) or the diﬀerence between the rate in the previous
month and the current rate must be greater than 300 basis points (which allows for the
possibility that a loan that is current could feasibly qualify for a modiﬁcation). In addition,
we allow for more modest month-to-month decreases in the interest rate (200 to 300 basis
points) as long as there is also a positive change in the delinquency status of the loan (that
is, the loan is reported to be less delinquent). Our inspection of the data suggests that the
majority of modiﬁcations involve a resetting of the delinquency status back to current, or a
minor delinquency, so conditioning on this change likely eliminates many false positives.
A.2 Term Extensions
In theory, it should be straightforward to identify term extensions in the LPS data, but it
can be tricky to do so because of possible measurement error in the variable that measures
the remaining maturity of each loan. We deﬁned a term extension in the LPS dataset to be a
case in which the loan was at least 30-days delinquent at some point and the number of years
remaining increases by at least 20 months or the change in number of years remaining is
greater than the diﬀerence between the original term of the loan and the remaining term (for
example, if the original maturity is 360 months, and the loan has 350 months remaining,
then the increase in length must be at least 10 months) and, ﬁnally, either the monthly
payment decreases or the principal balance increases or the loan is in loss mitigation.
A.3 Principal Balance Reductions
A reduction in the remaining balance of a mortgage is perhaps the most diﬃcult type of
modiﬁcation to identify because of the prevalence of “curtailment” or partial prepayment
among mortgage borrowers. For example, it is common for borrowers to submit extra
mortgage payments in order to pay down the loan at a faster rate. For this reason, we
were forced to adopt strict criteria to limit the number of false positives. Our criterion
for identifying a principal balance reduction is as follows: The month-to-month decrease in
28the remaining principal balance must be at least -10 percent and cannot be more than -30
percent (the upper bound does not matter as much as the lower bound—we experimented
with -40 percent and -50 percent, but did not ﬁnd a substantial diﬀerence); the principal
balance recorded in the previous month must be greater than $25,000 (since we throw second
liens out, and look only at mortgages originated after 2004, this cutoﬀ does not bind often);
the month-to-month payment change must be negative (there are only a few cases in which
the principal balance is reduced without a corresponding decrease in the payment, but in
these cases the term is extended, and thus is picked up in our code for identifying term
extensions); and, ﬁnally, the mortgage must be either 30-days delinquent or currently in
loss mitigation proceedings (as reported by the servicer).
A.4 Principal Balance Increases
For interest-only and fully-amortizing mortgages, identifying an increase in the principal
balance due to the addition of arrears is relatively straightforward. It becomes trickier
for mortgages that allow for negative amortization, as the principal balance is allowed to
increase over the course of the contract, by deﬁnition. For interest-only and fully-amortizing
mortgages our criterion is: The month-to-month principal balance must increase by at least
0.5 percent (to rule out measurement error in the data); the loan must have been at least
30-days delinquent at the time of the balance increase; and, ﬁnally, the month-to-month
payment change must be positive unless there is also a corresponding increase in the term
of the loan. For mortgages that allow for negative amortization, the criterion is similar,
except that the balance increase must be at least 1 percent and there must be a positive
change in the delinquency status of the loan.
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32Table 1: Examples of modiﬁcations in the data.
Example 1: Servicer cuts interest rate, capitalizes arrears in the balance of the loan and
extends term to 40 years.
MBA Interest Monthly Outstanding Remaining
Date Delinq. Stat. Rate Payment Balance Term in Months
2008m10 9 6.5 907 141,323 340
2008m11 9 6.5 907 141,323 339
2008m12 9 6.5 907 141,323 338
2009m1 C 4.5 660 146,686 479
Example 2: Servicer capitalizes arrears into the balance of the loan but otherwise leaves
the loan unchanged.
MBA Interest Monthly Outstanding Remaining
Date Delinq. Stat. Rate Payment Balance Term in Months
2008m5 6 9.25 1,726 208,192 346
2008m6 9 9.25 1,726 208,192 346
2008m7 9 9.25 1,726 208,192 346
2008m8 C 9.25 1,815 218,316 341
2008m9 C 9.25 1,815 218,184 340
33Table 2: Robustness of the modiﬁcations algorithm
False positives by type of modiﬁcations
# of Modiﬁcations False
Using WF CTS Data Positives
FRM Rate Reduction 5,381 8.0%
ARM Rate Reduction 8,951 22.0%
Principal Reductions 470 1.9%
Principal Increases 13,010 12.8%
Term Increases 394 2.3%
Overall success of algorithm
No Mod Using Mod Using
Our Algorithm Our Algorithm Total
No Mod in WF Data 2,329,187 3,559 2,332,746
Mod in WF Data 3,627 17,514 21,141
Total 2,332,814 21,073 2,353,887
Notes: We test our algorithm on a dataset of securitized mortgages in which
the trustee has identiﬁed modiﬁcations (data is from Wells Fargo Trustee
Services). The lower panel shows that about 17.2% of our modiﬁcations are
false positives, meaning that we identify modiﬁcations but the trustee does
not and about 16.9% are false negatives, meaning that the trustee identiﬁes
a modiﬁcation but we do not.
34Table 3: Modiﬁcation Statistics
(1) By Type of Modiﬁcation: 2007:Q1–2008:Q4
# Loans Interest Rate Principal Balance Principal Balance Term Extensions
Modiﬁed Reductions Reductions Increases
# (% total) # (% total) # (% total) # (% total)
2007:Q1 10,940 600 5.3 700 6.2 8,660 76.4 1,380 12.2
2007:Q2 14,600 820 5.4 550 3.7 11,630 77.3 2,050 13.6
2007:Q3 17,720 770 4.1 810 4.3 15,170 81.2 1,940 10.4
2007:Q4 27,150 2,990 9.7 700 2.3 22,520 72.8 4,740 15.3
2008:Q1 36,230 6,010 13.8 900 2.1 32,100 73.8 4,500 10.3
2008:Q2 44,750 9,050 16.4 1,300 2.4 39,750 72.1 5,030 9.1
2008:Q3 62,190 16,280 20.3 940 1.2 56,940 70.9 6,110 7.6
2008:Q4 74,800 28,630 26.7 1,450 1.4 65,960 61.5 11,230 10.5
(2) By Payment Change
Payment Decreases Payment Increases
# mean ∆ median ∆ # mean ∆ median ∆
$ % $ % $ % $ %
2007:Q1 2,080 -492 -13.2 -157 -10.0 5,020 106 6.7 62 4.4
2007:Q2 2,060 -464 -12.7 -141 -9.6 7,710 120 7.0 63 4.4
2007:Q3 2,470 -290 -12.9 -125 -9.7 10,380 110 6.7 60 4.3
2007:Q4 5,600 -367 -15.3 -159 -11.7 14,540 100 5.9 59 3.9
2008:Q1 11,500 -358 -14.0 -210 -13.2 18,720 108 6.5 62 4.3
2008:Q2 18,660 -425 -16.1 -239 -14.1 20,770 124 7.4 69 4.1
2008:Q3 31,770 -562 -21.5 -365 -20.2 26,400 124 6.3 63 3.6
2008:Q4 48,000 -503 -22.9 -315 -21.7 22,520 104 6.0 53 3.6
(3) Loan Characteristics of Modiﬁed Mortgages
All Loans Modiﬁcations
# mean p25 p50 p75 # mean p25 p50 p75
FICO (at origination) 1,892,777 706 660 713 762 17,533 622 580 621 662
LTV (at origination) 2,250,162 75 67 79 85 21,675 82 78 80 90
DTI (at origination) 1,346,093 37 28 38 45 13,945 41 35 41 47
Mortgage balance (at origination) 2,267,497 231K 121K 185K 288K 21K 234K 121K 186K 294K
% characterized as
LTV = 80 14.4 21.7
Subprime 6.8 47.4
Fixed 71.2 39.7







Vacation Home 3.7 1.1
Purchase 51.9 49.0
Low/no documentation 29.2 20.4
Notes: These statistics were computed using a 10% random sample of the LPS data. Quantities obtained from
the data are multiplied by a factor of 10. The percentages in panels (1) and (2) are taken with respect to the
total number of modiﬁcations, and not loans modiﬁed. Thus, there is double-counting in the sense that some
loans received multiple types of modiﬁcations in a given quarter.
35Table 4: Modiﬁcation Comparison by Payment Change
Private-label Modiﬁcations
Payment Decreases Payment Increases
# mean median # mean median
$ % $ % $ % $ %
2007:Q1 106 -614 -14.42 -162 -10.85 239 121 6.02 76 3.37
2007:Q2 110 -505 -12.02 -222 -9.30 364 168 7.96 76 3.49
2007:Q3 128 -261 -11.82 -131 -8.42 558 145 7.52 75 3.65
2007:Q4 288 -313 -13.38 -163 -12.36 741 125 6.24 74 3.52
2008:Q1 634 -393 -16.12 -261 -15.65 938 133 6.76 79 4.08
2008:Q2 1,014 -540 -18.94 -334 -17.89 1,241 152 8.14 83 4.08
2008:Q3 1,778 -641 -22.01 -423 -19.95 1,805 137 6.22 70 3.31
2008:Q4 1,993 -565 -21.73 -367 -20.13 1,398 118 5.91 61 3.23
Portfolio Modiﬁcations
Payment Decreases Payment Increases
# mean median # mean median
$ % $ % $ % $ %
2007:Q1 28 -759 -20.90 -428 -17.19 128 106 7.78 52 5.46
2007:Q2 19 -1172 -25.17 -656 -28.07 222 81 6.11 55 5.28
2007:Q3 31 -395 -17.13 -168 -15.29 255 71 6.13 43 5.37
2007:Q4 90 -474 -11.11 -90 -2.48 292 70 5.50 37 4.29
2008:Q1 187 -369 -10.00 -183 -8.08 331 80 6.59 33 3.97
2008:Q2 309 -304 -10.90 -117 -6.64 405 63 5.59 34 3.56
2008:Q3 376 -585 -25.19 -295 -17.85 359 105 7.04 39 4.26
2008:Q4 616 -794 -31.91 -384 -25.04 389 59 5.48 35 3.51
36Table 5: Modiﬁcations (Main Sample)
Panel A: Unconditional Percentages
Concessionary All Mods All Mods +
Mods Prepayments
Portfolio 0.032 0.087 0.147
Private-label 0.026 0.084 0.155
Panel B: Logit Regressions (12 month horizon)
Concessionary All Mods All Mods +
Mods Prepayments
Private-label -0.003 0.002 0.009
-1.69 0.58 1.95
Initial Rate 0.001 -0.004 -0.007
1.45 -5.7 -7.25
LTV Ratio 0 0 -0.002
-0.24 -1.68 -11.14
LTV = 80 0 -0.014 -0.034
-0.18 -6.25 -11.7
FICO 0 0 -0.002
-0.02 -0.43 -4.62
FICO2 0 0 0
-0.39 -0.08 3.95
FICO < 620 0.002 0.029 0.034
0.53 3.43 3.42
620 ≤ FICO < 680 0.005 0.017 0.024
1.46 2.95 3.41
Log Original Amount 0.004 0.007 0.022
3.12 2.96 7.47
Equity at Delinquency -0.001 -0.003 0
-0.4 -1.09 0
Negative Equity -0.006 -0.022 -0.022
-1.6 -3.17 -1.77
Unemployment 0 -0.002 -0.005
-0.37 -3.13 -4.37
Reﬁ 0.006 0.015 0.04
4.14 5.98 11.67
Subprime 0.02 0.037 0.042
9.32 11.71 10.87
Other Controls Y Y Y
# Mortgages 66,541 66,541 66,541
Panel C: Duration Model
Concessionary All Mods All Mods +
Mods Prepayments
Private-label 0.921 1.002 1.018
-1.41 0.07 0.68
# Mortgages 87,343 87,343 87,343
Notes: Other controls include indicator variables for Jumbo, Option, Hybrid and Interest-Only mortgages,
as well as for condos and multifamily homes. Panel B shows the marginal eﬀects of logit regressions with
a 12-month horizon, t-statistics shown below the coeﬃcients. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code
level. Panel C shows hazard ratio estimates from a Cox proportional hazards model.
37Table 6: Modiﬁcations (Robustness tests with alternative samples)
Panel A: Concessionary Modiﬁcations
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.032 0.047 0.034 0.028 0.023
Private-label Mean 0.026 0.037 0.031 0.033 0.037
Marginal Eﬀect -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0 0.007
(private-label) -1.69 -0.94 -0.77 -0.14 1.46
# Mortgages 66,541 33,719 27,639 25,543 18,097
Panel B: All Modiﬁcations
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.087 0.111 0.097 0.092 0.077
Private-label Mean 0.084 0.103 0.109 0.107 0.124
Marginal Eﬀect 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.025
(private-label) 0.58 0.61 1.06 0.97 2.94
# Mortgages 66,541 33,719 27,639 25,543 18,097
Notes: Portfolio and private-label means are unconditional probabilities of modiﬁcation in each sample.
Marginal eﬀects are computed from logit models with a 12-month horizon that include all the controls in
Table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. t-statistics are reported below the marginal
eﬀects.
38Table 7: Modiﬁcations Conditional on 30 Days Delinquency (Logits)
Panel A: Concessionary Mods
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.014 0.025 0.016 0.014 0.012
Private-label Mean 0.014 0.021 0.016 0.017 0.019
Marginal Eﬀect -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(Logit) -2.72 -2.31 -0.55 -1.57 0.37
Hazard Ratio 1.03 1.147 1.027 0.969 1.237
(Cox) 0.59 1.83 0.31 -0.42 2.34
# Mortgages 120,558 51,285 43,550 47,993 34,403
Panel B: All Mods
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.038 0.056 0.051 0.042 0.052
Private-label Mean 0.042 0.055 0.051 0.047 0.035
Marginal eﬀect -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 -0.001
(Logit) -2.39 -1.79 -1.22 -3.16 -0.2
Hazard Ratio 1.043 0.951 1.008 0.909 1.065
(Cox) 1.42 -1.05 0.17 -2.23 1.21
# Mortgages 120,558 51,285 43,550 47,993 34,403
Panel C: All Mods + Prepayment
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.145 0.195 0.152 0.147 0.13
Private-label Mean 0.174 0.211 0.218 0.185 0.198
Marginal eﬀect 0.023 0.021 0.044 0.016 0.029
(Logit) 7.31 2.98 6.46 3.47 4.54
Hazard Ratio 1.158 1.05 1.181 1.098 1.202
(Cox) 9.09 1.69 5.72 3.88 6.56
# Mortgages 120,558 51,285 43,550 47,993 34,403
Notes: Portfolio and private-label means are unconditional probabilities of modiﬁcation in each sample.
Marginal eﬀects are computed from logit models with a 12-month horizon that include all the controls
in Table 5. Hazard ratios are computed from Cox proportional hazard models with the same controls as
in Table 5. z-statistics are shown below the coeﬃcients, and t-statistics are reported below the marginal
eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level. Sample sizes refer to the logit regressions. The
sample sizes for the Cox models are slightly larger.
39Table 8: redefault Conditional on Modiﬁcation
Panel A: Payment Reducing Mods
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.308 0.386 0.332 0.228 0.249
Private-label Mean 0.358 0.392 0.371 0.362 0.359
Marginal eﬀect 0.016 -0.001 -0.015 0.03 -0.004
(Logit) 0.66 -0.03 -0.35 0.81 -0.1
# Mortgages 4,626 2,514 1,562 1,475 1,135
Panel B: All Mods
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.393 0.53 0.444 0.404 0.403
Private-label Mean 0.449 0.5 0.501 0.482 0.482
Marginal eﬀect 0.008 -0.023 -0.009 -0.021 -0.033
(Logit) 0.58 -0.84 -0.38 -0.97 -1.24
# Mortgages 14,796 7,073 5,344 4,594 3,620
Notes: redefault is deﬁned as loans that are 60 days delinquent, 90 days delinquent, in the process of
foreclosure or in REO 6 months after the modiﬁcation. Marginal Eﬀects refer to the marginal eﬀects of a
logit model with a horizon of 6 months. t-statistics shown below the marginal eﬀects. Standard errors are
clustered at the zip code level.
Table 9: Cure Conditional on 60 Days Delinquency
All Loans Subprime FICO < 620 Non-missing Fully Documented
Documentation and DTI
Portfolio Mean 0.300 0.257 0.320 0.280 0.299
Private-label Mean 0.256 0.289 0.328 0.289 0.324
Marginal eﬀect -0.022 0.043 0.004 0.022 0.025
(Logit) -4.32 4.31 0.44 2.8 2.43
# Mortgages 66,451 33,719 27,639 25,543 18,097
Notes: The dependent variable (“Cure”) is deﬁned as a loan that is either current, 30 days delinquent, or
prepaid 12 months after the ﬁrst 60-day delinquency. Portfolio and Private-label means are unconditional
probabilities of modiﬁcation in each sample. Marginal eﬀects are computed from logit models with a 12-
month horizon that include all the controls in Table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.
t-statistics are reported below the marginal eﬀects.
40Figure 1:
(1) Model of loan modiﬁcation
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Don’t Modify
p = α0 Default
x1 = P1 − λ





Modify x1 = m∗
p = α1 Default
x2 = P1 − λ
p = 1 − α1
No Default
x2 = M∗









































Lender loses if R is large
or if P1 − P2 is big
41